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Abstract
Initial public offerings, even though risky, typically underperform
the indices for the first few years after offering. This can be explained by
high divergence of opinion raising the initial market price, and by this
divergence of opinion declining over time. With time, the valuation of the
price setting marginal investor comes closer to the average investor’s
valuation. This theory also explains why the firms with the greatest
underperformance are those with a short operating history, low sales, low
prestige underwriters, low institutional ownership, high volatility, high
underpricing at the time of issuance, listing on regional exchanges, and
those in certain industries.

In the well researched US market, it has been discovered that initial
public offerings (IPO’s) underperform the market for the first few years
after the offering, when return is measured from the start of trading until
three to five years later. Such long run underperformance has also been
reported for other markets.
This effect should be distinguished from the better known tendency
for initial public offerings to be underpriced, and to hence undergo a
sharp initial rise from the initial offering price to the start of trading (and
hence to the first days close), an effect discussed in the same studies that
document the long run underperformance (see references).
The argument will proceed in several stages. First the evidence for
low returns from US initial public offerings will be summarized. Greater
divergence of opinion will then be shown to raise prices. Higher prices
alone lower the rate of return for any given stream of dividends. In
addition, the divergence of opinion about the typical initial public offering
declines over time, and this produces a decline in the stock price. It will
then be argued that divergence of opinion declines after an initial public
offering and that this can explain the long run underperformance.
It will be shown that a number of otherwise puzzling facts related to
the cross-sectional variation in the magnitude of the long run price
declines can be explained. These include the relationships between return
and company size, age, industry, underwriter prestige, institutional
ownership, exchange of listing, and initial volatility.
Long Run Returns to IPO's
Ibbotson (1975), after examining one random selected security from
each month in the sixties, found a saucer shaped pattern. There were
positive returns near the offering, followed by below market returns, with
the fourth year returns tending towards normal. Performance for the first
48 months was below normal. The distribution of returns was highly
skewed (most returns negative, but a few very high), indicating that these
investments were individually very risky. Given the small sample size and
the high standard deviations, the shortfall in performance was not
statistically significant.
Ritter (1991) examined the returns from 1,526 initial public
offerings made between 1975 and 1984. The three-year return was
34.47%. A control sample of 1,526 firms matched for industry and size
returned 61.86% over the same three years.
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Loughran (1993) examined the returns from 3,556 IPO’s during
1967-1987 and found an average six year total return of 17.29%
compared with 76.23% for the NASDAQ index during an identical period,
showing results appreciably worse than Ritter had found for his three
year tests. Strong underperformance was also found in comparison with
firms of similar size on both the New York Stock exchange and on
NASDAQ. A regression equation for July 1973- December 1988 had a
statistically significant negative coefficient for having had a IPO within six
years, even though the exchange and the book to market ratio were
controlled for.
Later, Loughran & Ritter (1995) examined initial public offering from
1970-1990. They found that the average rate of return was only 5% per
year for the five years after issuance, compared to 12 percent for firms of
comparable size. The results are even worse for the median firms, where
after five years, the 4,753 initial public offerings had a negative return of
39%, while the size matched firms had a positive return of 16% for the
five years. The authors calculate that the forgone return was $39 billion
dollars, making the underperformance of economic significance.
Servaes & Rajan (1997) examined initial public offerings from 19751987. They found a found a five year raw return of 24%. This represented
a 47% underperformance when compared against NYSE/AMEX index, a
17% underperformance against the smallest decile from the
NYSE/AMEX, and a 41% underperformance against firms matched by
size and industry.
Research by Bravo & Gompers (1997; Gompers & Lerner, 1999)
using a slightly different set of years found essentially the same
magnitude of underperformance effects, with the underperformance
greater for non-venture capital-backed companies. Teo, Welch, and Wong
(1998) using firms going public between 1975 and 1984 found
underperformance, showing in addition that firms using more aggressive
accounting had greater underperformance. Aggarwal & Rivoli (1990)
found that 1598 IPO's offered from 1977 to 1987 underperformed the US
market by 13.73% over the first 250 trading days.
The underperformance has persisted even though it has been
publicized in the business press. Forbes magazine (Stern, Richard &
Bernstein, 1985, as cited in Ritter, 1991) found, after analyzing 1,922
IPO’s priced over $1.00 issued from January 1975 to June 1985, that
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"from its date as going public to last month, the average new issue was
down 22% relative to the broad Standard & Poors 500 stock index."
It might be noted that most of these US studies involve overlapping
time periods, and to a large extent are reporting on the same IPO's. The
effect is robust because differing methodologies come to the same
conclusions despite using different statistical methods (including
controlling for a range of other variables). However, two US studies
covered earlier periods. Simon (1989) found that IPO's offered from 1926
to 1933 listed on regional exchanges showed substantial
underperformance over 60 months. Stoll & Curley (1970) found
underperformance for 205 small issues in the fifties and sixties.
The underperformance is not limited to the United States. Levis
(1993) examined the three year performance of 712 UK IPO's issued
between 1980 and 1988 and found underperformance that varied
between 8.3% and 23.0%, depending on the benchmark chosen. Uhlir
(1988) found an underperformance of 7.4% after one year for German
issues 1977-1987. Finn & Higham's (1988) examined 93 Australian IPO's
for 1966-1978. They found that buying at the end of the listing month
and holding to the end of the first year earned 6.52% below the indices,
but that this loss was not quite statistically significant. Kunz & Aggarwal
(1994) found 42 Swiss IPO's between 1983 and 1989 experienced an
underperformance of 6.1%. Keloharju (1993) found that the average
Finnish IPO lost 22.4% from the first market trading to three years later,
versus 1.6% average decline for the market index. The US pattern of
underperformance appears to extend to other countries.
The underperformance effect is not limited to developed countries,
but also extends to emerging markets. Aggarwal, Leal, & Hernandez
(1993) found that Brazilian IPO's had an underperformance of 47% after
three years. For Chile, the underperformance after three years averaged
23.7%, while for Mexico the underperformance after one year was 19.6%.
Dawson (1987) examined the one year market adjusted returns for
initial public offerings in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia during
1978-1984, and found those in Hong Kong were down 9.3%, and those in
Singapore were down 2.7%. However, neither decline was statistically
significant. In contrast, there was a positive, statistically significant
overperformance in Malaysia of 18.2%. The author points out that the
Malaysian index he used was not a market wide one, but an industrial
one. The one exception to the pattern of underperformance is India where
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Shah (1995) finds (in a large data set with 2056 IPO's from 1991-1995),
that the IPO's typically outperform the market for the first 200 trading
days, and then decline. After 400 days they are approximately at the level
of the first trading day.
Thus, it appears that in most countries, IPO's underperform the
market over periods of one to five years. The IPO studies mentioned
typically do not adjust for risk (due to the difficulty of measuring risk
when there is no trading history), but compare them to other stocks. IPO
returns are much more variable than most stocks, with the mean return
usually exceeding the median (a few large winners raise the average).
Thus, because of their high risk (especially for undiversified individual
investors who can not count on a portfolio with only a few securities
including any of the big winners among the IPO's) one would expect them
to outperform the indices. Even on a systematic risk basis (beta), IPO’s
appear to be riskier than average (see below). The major problem, which
this article aims to provide a solution for, is to explain this long run
underperformance.
The problem is to explain why this happens. A theory will now be
proposed.
Divergence of Opinion and Price
The theory being offered to explain long run underperformance of
initial public offerings is that the divergence of opinion about the value of
the initial public offering typically declines over time. This causes the
price of the stock to decline relative to its fair price (taken here to be the
true present value of its future dividends). This effect is augmented by the
IPO's typically having a large divergence of opinion, which in itself tends
to raise the price and to lower the rate of return. To make this argument
it is necessary to first show that divergence of opinion tends to raise
prices.
The key empirical fact is that investors differ about the valuation of
securities. This is not surprising given the difficulty of estimating the
value of a security. While there is general agreement among theoreticians
that the value should equal the present value of all future cash flows (see
standard texts such as Elton & Gruber, 1995; Haugen, 1997; or Reilly &
Brown 1994), disagreement occurs about relevant discount rates, and the
estimates of dividends for each particular year. Thus, the usual efficient
markets theory assumption of homogeneous expectations is unrealistic. It
will be replaced here with heterogeneous expectations.
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However, to make it clear that the argument does not depend on
systematic errors, each investor's estimates will be assumed to be
unbiased. If we averaged the estimates of value made by each investor,
they would correctly estimate the present value of future dividends,
although the investor may be wrong about any particular stock.
The bell shaped curve in the top panel of Figure 1 shows the
distribution of investors’ opinions about the stock's value. The value
estimates are along the horizontal axis. The estimates reflect the
maximum amount an investor will pay for the stock. The vertical axis
shows the number of investors who hold a certain estimate of the stock’s
value.
<Insert Figure 1 about here>
Imagine for a moment that all investors who like a stock (i.e. believe
it belongs in their portfolio at the current price) purchase one shares.
Now start on the right hand part of the curve, and calculate the area
under the curve to the right of the vertical line from the market-clearing
rate. This area indicates the number of investors who believe the stock is
worth purchasing at the current price. When multiplied by the typical
number of shares an investor purchases (assumed to be one for the
moment), the total number of shares bought is determined.
A demand curve can be derived from this data. The stock's price is
where this demand curve intersects the supply curve (a vertical line
indicating the number of shares issued). This is the economist's
traditional model of price determination applied to stocks.
However, it is not necessary to actually draw the demand curve.
Imagine an auction where the rate of return is dropped until there are
just enough investors willing to hold the stock to fully absorb the existing
shares. If each investor purchases one share, this is the number of
shareholders the company will have. In practice, investors purchase more
than one share, with the number depending on the size of the investor's
portfolio and how diversified he wishes it to be. However, one can easily
weight the investors by their wealth, or the number of shares they will
purchase if they choose to include it in their portfolio. At the equilibrium
rate price, the area marked represents the weighted number of investors
required to hold the issued shares.
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In examining the diagram, notice that the valuation of the marginal
investor does not equal the valuation of the average investor (except by
coincidence). For a symmetrical bell shaped curve, the average opinion is
the valuation at the peak of the curve (the mode). Normally there are
enough different stocks in a market that any one stock is purchased by
only a minority of all investors. Thus, it follows that the marginal
investor's estimate of value will be on the right hand side of the bell
curve, as is shown in the diagram.
Given our assumption that the investor's opinions are unbiased
estimates of the stock's value, it implies that the price setting marginal
investor will have a willingness to pay that exceeds the typical market
participant’s valuation. If the typical market participant is presumed to
have a correct estimate for the present value of all future dividends, it
follows the price will exceed the present value of future dividends.
Marginal investors set the price of stocks, and these are the more
optimistic investors. In simple terms, the optimists set the price. Who the
optimistic investors are depends on the stock. An investor who is
optimistic about one stock may be pessimistic about another stock. In the
model being discussed here, where every investor has unbiased return
estimates,1 it is still possible for any particular investor to be wrong about
a certain stock. The stocks in his portfolio will not be a random selection
of all stocks, but will be those he is relatively optimistic about. The
unbiasedness just means that over all stocks, the estimates are correct
on average.
At times, the opinions of the optimists can differ sharply from the
average opinion. A recent example of this is provided by the Internet
stocks, which most current investors feel are grossly overvalued. Yet
these stocks find buyers, and their prices remain high. This theory
explains this overpricing by noting that the optimists about these stocks
set the prices, and they are much more optimistic about these stocks
than the average investor.
The basic idea here is merely an application of the idea of the
winner's curse to the stock market (see Thaler 1992 for a discussion of
the winner's curse).
Now let us do the thought experiment of imagining that the shape of
the bell curve in the top panel of Figure 1 remains constant as the
standard deviation of the curve declines. The lower panel of Figure 1
shows a stock with the same mean estimate of value as the stock in the
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upper panel, but with a narrower distribution. The market-clearing price
is marked on both diagrams. As can be seen, the price in the bottom
panel is lower.
This diagram demonstrates a very important point. Holding all
things equal, the lower a stock's divergence of opinion, the lower the
price. The price is influenced not merely by factors that affect the average
estimate of its future value and risk, but by the extent of the divergence
of opinion. This is a factor that is not in the traditional capital asset
pricing model.
It should also be noted that even when the divergence of opinion
does not change over time, the greater the divergence of opinion the lower
the anticipated return on the stock. This can be easily seen. The return
over a period of time (here taken as one year for convenience) is by
definition (Dividend + Capital Gain)/Purchase Price. The above argument
shows that (all things equal) the greater the divergence of opinion, the
higher the price of the security. However, from the definition of the rate of
return, the higher the price of the security, the lower the rate of return.
Explaining Long Run Underperformance
Figure 1 shows that with a smaller divergence of opinion, the price
is lower. It follows that if the divergence of opinion should decline (all
other things equal), the stock price should also decline.
Divergence of opinion often declines in the years following an initial
public offering. When a company is new, there is often great uncertainty
about its future. Some investors will be much more optimistic than
others. These optimistic investors will set the price. As a result, the
divergence of opinion will be greater for an initial public offering than for
the typical seasoned stock. The effect of this greater divergence of opinion
is to raise the stock price and lower the return.
In addition, as the company develops an operating history, it
becomes easier to forecast its future earnings and dividends. The
divergence of opinion shrinks. This lowers the price relative to wellseasoned stocks given the same mean valuations by investors (as
depicted in the diagram).
The above argument shows that speculators can expect to be
disappointed. Even if their estimates of value are unbiased, they will
suffer from a winner's curse effect in which the securities whose values
they overestimate are disproportionately represented in their portfolio.
The more speculative the security, as measured by the divergence of
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opinion, the worse the performance is likely to be. Since risk and
uncertainty are correlated with divergence of opinion (Miller 1977),
divergence of opinion might be measured by the uncertainty about the
returns from a security. To test this prediction it would be nice to have a
measure of uncertainty. Such a measure is not readily available, but
several surrogates will be discussed below.
Short selling
In countries where short selling is permitted, an additional effect
may occur. The stock of initial public offerings cannot be sold short
(except by the underwriters) at the start of trading. The reason is that the
short selling process requires borrowing the certificates in order to make
delivery. However, it takes a while for the underwriter to actually
distribute the shares, and until this process is completed the stock is not
available for lending. Of course, in many countries short selling will
appear after the start of trading, and this short selling will lower the price
a little. However, since the quantity of short selling in all countries is
small, this effect is limited, even in countries where there are institutions
for short selling. In many emerging markets short selling is not possible.
Going through the descriptions of third world markets in Price
(1994), among the markets for which security borrowing is not available
are Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Hungary, Poland, Greece, Turkey, Korea,
Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, India, Pakistan, and
China. In other countries it is indicated as available, but rare. For
instance, the phrase describing securities lending for Argentina is
"permitted, but not frequently used," and for Venezuela "While securities
lending is not specifically prohibited by law, it is rarely practiced". Selling
short requires, among other things, the ability to borrow securities to
deliver after the short sale. Later, securities are bought in the open
market to replace the borrowed securities, and the short position is
closed out. Institutions for borrowing are available in the US and other
developed markets (although not all stocks can be borrowed, and the
borrower frequently sacrifices part or all of the return on the proceeds of
the short sale).
Seasoning
However, there is another factor. In financial theory, the value of the
stock is the present value of the future dividends. Admittedly, the
greatest divergence of opinion about an initial public offering will be
about its future operating success, and hence its dividends. However, the
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present value also depends on the rate of discount. The rate of discount
in turn depends on the beta of the stock, and on how easily and at what
cost it can be traded (its liquidity, for short). For seasoned companies
with a trading history, the beta and the liquidity can be estimated fairly
well from historical statistics, and investors do not disagree much.
However, an initial public offering, by definition, lacks a trading history.
Investors may differ in their estimates of the beta, and how easily and at
what cost the stock could be traded in the future. Those that think it will
have an illiquid market will be willing to pay much less than those who
anticipate a very liquid market. Occasionally, there is even uncertainty
about whether it will be accepted for exchange listing. After the public
offering, a trading history develops and the divergence of opinion
diminishes about the cost of trading the security, its liquidity, and its
beta. Divergence of opinion theory predicts, all things equal, that this
seasoning should lower the price. In contrast, the capital asset pricing
model predicts that seasoning should raise the price by reducing the
uncertainty.
Testing the Theory
As was pointed out in the introduction, what is predicted here is
just what is observed. IPO’s underperform the market for the first few
years.
The above model makes other predictions, predictions that deal with
which initial public offerings would decline most over time. The theory
can be tested not only by observing whether initial public offerings show
long run underperformance. It can also be tested by whether it can
explain the cross sectional (across IPO’s) pattern of underperformance.
The theory predicts that the greater the initial divergence of opinion
and uncertainty, and the greater the diminution over time, the more the
security should underperform the market. Because most initial public
offerings represent relatively new businesses, and are frequently in new
industries, the divergence of opinion typically diminishes over time.
However, initial public offerings differ as to how uncertain their futures
are.
The model predicts that the underperformance should be greatest
for the initial public offerings having greatest initial uncertainty about
their true value. Since there are no direct measures of uncertainty about
the value at the time of the initial offering, it is necessary to find variables
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that proxy for the degree of initial uncertainty. An obvious proxy for the
degree of risk at the time of issuance is the risk right after the IPO.
Evidence that seasoning occurs and risk declines over time
Shah (1995) calculates the standard deviation of returns as a
function of the days from the start of trading for a large sample of Indian
IPO's and shows that the returns are much more variable for the first few
days of trading, which he interprets as a period during which the market
is seeking the proper price for a security.
Direct evidence that the risks of IPO's decline over time is provided
by Finn & Higham's (1988) study of 93 Australian IPO's. They found the
beta was a very high 3.35 for stocks in their first month, but only 1.45
for all stocks within two months of their issue. It is clear that the
economic risk of the business does not decline this much over the first
month. This reduction in beta reflects a process of seasoning that is
probably due to a reduction in the divergence of opinion about the stock.
After the first few months, the beta varies month to month with a low of
1.12 in the fifth month (and with beta through the twelfth and last month
of the study being 1.32). Similar results were reported by Clarkson &
Thompson (1990) who found that beta declined over the first 25 days and
the first 20 months for a 1976 to 1985 sample of 198 US IPO’s. For the
daily data, the beta declined from about 3.1 for the first day to slightly
over one. For the monthly data it declined from 3.5 month to about 1.2
(read from the graphs) after 10 months.
Ritter (1991) reports that the beta averaged 1.39 for the first year,
1.24 for the next year, and 1.14 for the third year, again showing the
tendency for beta risk to decline over time. Betas for all three years are
above unity. Part of these higher betas probably reflect the industry and
size of the firms, since the betas for the matched firms were 1.14, 1.13,
and 1.04 respectively. However, the betas for IPO’s still appear to be
higher than for seasoned firms.
By definition, beta is the correlation coefficient of the stock’s return
with the market’s return multiplied by the ratio of the standard deviation
of the stock to the market’s standard deviation. It is likely that the beta
decline is primarily due to a decline in the variability of the stock price,
and the process of seasoning. Seasoning in the model presented is
accompanied by a decline in uncertainty and in divergence of opinion. It
might be noted that the capital asset pricing model would predict that the
decline in beta with time would be accompanied by an increase in price,

11
which would cause initial public offerings to outperform the market,
which is the opposite to what is observed.
If the variability in the stock price is interpreted as a measure of the
divergence of opinion, the prediction is that the price will decline over
time with the variance. This is what is observed.
Volatility
In finance, price and return volatility is frequently used as a
measure of risk and uncertainty, surrogates for the divergence of opinion.
Also, the greater the divergence of opinion, the greater the sensitivity to
random buying and selling (reflecting a greater slope to the demand
curve). Thus price and return volatility can serve as surrogates for
divergence of opinion. Of course, volatility cannot be measured before a
company goes public, but it can be measured afterwards.
Ritter (1984) measured volatility by the daily standard deviation of
the returns in the first 20 days after the initial public offerings. He
documented that as this measure of volatility correlates with the return
on the initial offering (The return rises from 6.4% on the least volatile
issues up to 59.5% for the most volatile issues).
Carter, Dark, & Singh (1998) have also found that the standard
deviation of 2, 292 1979-1981 IPO's (over the first 225 days commencing
6 days after the offer) has a statistically significant (one in a hundred
level) effect on the initial underpricing of IPO's (i.e. how much they jump
from the offering price to the price on the first day of trading. More
relevant to the subject of this article, the same standard deviation also
predicts the underperformance found over the first three years. This
observation is as predicted by divergence of opinion theory.
Initial return, uncertainty, and underperformance
Beatty and Ritter (1986, p. 216) have argued that "the expected
underlying underpricing of an initial public offering increased as the ex
ante uncertainty increased." In an appendix they use Rock's (1986)
theory2 for the equilibrium underpricing to show this mathematically. His
1986 paper provides empirical support for this proposition.
Ritter (1991, Table V) divides the initial public offers in his 19751984 sample into five quintiles by the extent of the initial underpricing,
and shows that the underperformance in the quintile with the greatest
initial return (over 23.7%) had the lowest total return over three years.
These firms return was only 9.45%, while the matched firms had
averaged a three year return of 61.39%. For the next quintile (initial
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returns from 23.70% to 8.105%), the IPO's had a three year performance
of 27.94%, while the matched firms were up 65.52%. The remaining
three quintiles did not differ greatly in the extent of their three year
performance (from 41% to 48%), although they still showed appreciable
underperformance. Interestingly, the effect was concentrated among the
smaller IPO's, those with gross proceeds under $7.5 million. Size is itself
another surrogate for difficulty of predicting the future of a company, and
for divergence of opinion. (The offerings with lower gross proceeds are
often of start up firms who do not yet have an established history of
operations.)
In a multiple regression for explaining three-year returns, Ritter
(1991) found that initial return had the predicted negative sign, but the
effect was not statistically significant. This is probably because the other
variables in the equation (market return, age, volume of IPO’s in that
year, and oil and financial institution dummies) picked up much of the
effect of uncertainty about the offering. Let us discuss these other
variables.
Size and underperformance
In discussing the initial underpricing of IPO’s, Ritter (1984, p222223) comments that "One proxy for the difficulty of valuing a firm is how
established it is, where one could use the age of the firm, the book value
of equity, its annual sales, or some combination of these to define
established. For small firms with little or no operating history, it seems
clear that there would be a great deal of uncertainty regarding the
appropriate price per share, subjecting an uninformed investor to the
adverse selection problem that ,. . . forces issues to underprice their
offerings substantially. More established firms are presumably easier to
value, and one would expect that, on average, less money would have to
be left 'on the table' to compensate investors for evaluating established
firms than for startups." He notes that the firms with low sales tended to
be startup firms with a long history of operations.
On this reasoning Ritter (1984) uses sales as a surrogate for risk.3
He finds that the firms that had sales of less than $500,000 (in the most
recent twelve month period before going public) had an initial return of
43.4% while firms with sales over $4,000,000 had an initial return of
9.6% (the intermediate category had returns of 18.3%). Sales is one
measure of size, value is another.
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Later, Loughran & Ritter (1995) reported that when all the initial
public offerings (in their sample) from 1970 to 1990 were weighted by
value, the value weighted buy and hold return over five years was 34%
(versus 67% for the matching firms). They (p. 38) comment that, "This is
higher than the equally weighted 16% average returns for the 4,753 IPO's
going public from 1970-1990, reflecting the pattern that the smaller
offerings (frequently more speculative firms) underperform by more than
the large firms." This is as the theory would predict.
Bravo & Gompers (1997) also found that the underperformance was
greatest for the smallest (by market value) initial public offerings. For
non-venture capital backed firms in the smallest size quintile, the fiveyear return was actually negative. Likewise, Keloharju (1993) found that
for Finland the smaller IPO's did appreciably worse than the other IPO's,
compared to an equally weighted index.
The smallest issues are likely to be from the newest, least
established firms. A firm starts as an idea in someone’s head. The closer
a firm is to the idea stage of its life history, the smaller the sales, the
smaller the total investment, and the lower its market value. The same
conclusion would be reached if one discounts the present value of
operating profits. The further in time the firm is from its anticipated full
size, the smaller the present value of its future profits. Thus, by several
arguments it appears the small initial public offerings will be the most
speculative ones, the ones with the greatest divergence of opinion, and
the ones expected to underperform the most.
Firm age
Ritter (1984, p223) comments on the relationship between difficulty
in valuation and long run underperformance that "this relation is not
sensitive to the categorization adopted, and it also holds for other risk
proxies, such as the age of the firm." The age of the firm is probably the
best proxy for the initial uncertainty about its future. The future of startups and near start-ups is notoriously hard to predict.
Later, Ritter (1991) tabulated returns by age to find that the three
year wealth relatives (value compared to a portfolio of matching firms)
increased monotonically with age. His wealth relatives measure how the
wealth from investing in IPO’s compares to the wealth one would have
had from investing in the comparison firms. Wealth relatives rose from a
low of .623 for firms aged 0 –1 year (at the time of the IPO) to 1.142 for
firms aged over 20 years. The pattern was still montonically increasing
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when oil and gas firms (which had the worst performance of any
industry, combined with an average age of only 2 years) and financial
institutions (which had the best performance, combined with an average
age of 49 years) were excluded. Thus, the effect was not due to these two
industries. In a multi-variable equation for explaining three-year IPO
returns, the log of 1 plus age was statistically significant (.01 level).
Fields (1995) investigated the role of age, using even more IPO’s,
(2793) IPO's from 1979-1989. Wealth relatives (Table 9) after three years
were .76 for firms 0-1 years in age at the time of going public, and .72 for
firms 2-5 years in age when they went public. These were essentially
startups. In contrast, firms aged over 16 years, which were presumably
well seasoned, actually outperformed her comparison firms, with a wealth
relative of 1.07.
The finding she emphasized was that IPO's with the larger
institutional ownership (another measure that can be viewed as a
surrogate for risk and divergence of opinion) outperformed those with
smaller institutional ownership. She, as have others, found that three
year buy and hold returns were highest for the largest IPO's (measured by
capitalization, another surrogate for divergence of opinion).
In a multiple regression framework with one digit industry dummy
variables and 43 dummy variables for time, institutional ownership, age
(in log form), and size were all statistically significant. The statistically
significant effect for age is predicted by divergence of opinion theory, but
not by other theories. As noted, institutional ownership and size can be
interpreted as surrogates for the degree of uncertainty about a stock’s
value.
Industry
Industry is another plausible surrogate for difficulty in forecasting.
Certain industries (notably the high tech ones) are notoriously hard to
forecast, while other industries are easier to predict. Bravo (1998) found
that statistically significant underperformance was found in all but three
industries: financial institutions, insurance, and restaurant chains.
These are industries where people might agree more about methods of
valuation and the future of companies, than for other industries. Ritter
(1991) also found that financial institution’s IPO’s outperformed the
matching firms (achieving a three-year wealth relative of 1.433). The
difference between financial institutions’ IPO’s and other IPO’s was
statistically significant (at the one in a thousand level). He comments (p.
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17) “Most of the financial institution IPO’s involve mutual saving banks
and mutual saving and loan associations converting to stock companies
after a 1982 regulatory change.” The average age of the issuing financial
institutions was 49 (no other industry had an average age of over 8
years). There is probably relatively little divergence of opinion about the
futures of such long established firms, and the little that exists is unlikely
to diminish much after the offering. Thus the absence of
underperformance for this industry is quite consistent with divergence of
opinion theory.
Underwriter reputation
Carter, Dark, & Singh (1998) and Nanda, Yi, & Yun (1995) have
shown that underwriter reputation is related to the long run performance
of IPO's. It is very likely that the underwriter’s reputation reflects the
quality of the information available, and that the IPO’s underwritten by
lower reputation underwriters have greater divergence of opinion. The
reason is that the underwriters with better reputations have more to lose
from a failed underwriting, and as a result they refrain from underwriting
IPO’s whose future is very uncertain or whose returns are hard to predict.
Exchange of listing
Simon (1989) found that IPO's offered from 1926 to 1933 listed on
regional exchanges showed substantial underperformance over 60
months, while this was not true for IPO's listed on the New York Stock
Exchange. The IPO's listed on the regional exchanges had a cumulative
60 month performance of -52% (a footnote states this was a simple sum
of the monthly abnormal returns, and that these compounded to -39%),
with over 85% of the firms (30 out of 35) suffering significant losses. A
simpler model where returns were only adjusted for the market return
(no adjustment for beta, industry etc.) showed a cumulative negative
performance for the regionally listed firms of 74%, but a negative
performance of 22% for the NYSE listed firms (statistically significant at
10%). The most likely reason for the performance varying with the
exchange is that the New York Stock Exchange had listing and disclosure
requirements, but the regional exchanges did not. These listing
requirements would have forced the most speculative IPO's onto the
regional exchanges. In particular, the New York Stock Exchange’s
requirements for historical data would have eliminated start up firms
with only a short operating history. Also, the information disclosed
probably served to reduce the divergence of opinion for the New York
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Stock Exchange listed IPO’s. After the imposition of the Security and
Exchange Commission regulations, the difference in performance among
the exchanges disappeared.
Implications
The empirical evidence shows that IPO’s typically underperform the
markets. This paper has explained why. The obvious implication for
investors is that they should avoid investing in initial public offerings if
they cannot get them at the issuance price (which is typically below the
price at which they begin trading). If they do get them at the issuance
price, it would probably be wise to “flip” them at the first practical
opportunity (i.e. once there is no longer a threat of the underwriter
penalizing them). In quantitative models (Jacobs & Levy 1988, for
instance) for predicting returns from stocks, one variable should be
whether the issue has had an initial public offering in the last few years.
At a more sophisticated level, investors need to recognize they are
vulnerable to a winner’s curse effect. For the investor in well seasoned
stocks the bias is likely to be of similar effects at both the buying and
selling ends, leaving little effect on the capital gain. However, as
discussed above, investors in initial public offerings should expect that
the divergence of opinion should decline over time, adversely affecting
their returns. Thus, in making estimates of the returns to be expected
from IPO’s, some adjustment for this effect would be appropriate.
The problem is exactly how to adjust for the effect. As the above
discussion showed, it is not enough to make unbiased estimates of the
returns from investments. Even with these investors will typically be
disappointed. The reason is that investments are not made randomly, but
are conditional on the investor believing the stock offers high risk
adjusted returns. This means that stocks whose returns have been
overestimated are more likely to be included in the portfolio than stocks
whose returns have been underestimated. As a result the returns on
stocks conditional to being included in the portfolio tend to be less than
expected. This effect is especially important for IPO’s where the
divergence of opinion is especially high.
How is the potential investor to protect himself against this effect.
The problem has been discussed in the context of capital budgeting
(Miller1978, forthcoming). Investing is after all merely another example of
capital budgeting. A solution can be based on Bayesian methods. The
estimates made with the traditional methods of security analysis are
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combined with the prior information that arises from the knowledge that
one is exposed to the winner’s curve effect. Bayesian statistics provides
an optimal way to combine information from the two sources. The
combined information can then be used for making decisions about
investing in IPO’s.
Conclusions
The above shows that divergence of opinion is capable of explaining
the underpricing of initial public offerings. Divergence of opinion theory
had earlier been applied to explaining the long run underperformance of
IPO’s (Miller 1977), an explanation that had been noted by several
commentators including Ritter (1991). It is now (and apparently for the
first time) used to explain why firms with the greatest underperformance
are those with a short operating history, low sales, low prestige
underwriters, low institutional ownership, high volatility, high
underpricing at the time of issuance, listing on regional exchanges, and
in certain industries. This adds to the list of effects the theory can
explain, since it had earlier been shown to be able to explain the
discounts on closed end funds, the wealth creating effects of spin-offs
(Miller 1995), and the flatness of the security market line (Miller 1999).
A decline in divergence of opinion can be expected to lower prices,
all things equal. Normally the divergence of opinion declines during the
years following an initial public offering. This causes the valuation of the
price setting marginal investor to move closer to the valuation of the
average investor. This is why initial public offering often underperform
the overall markets
The extent of the long run underperformance is predicted by various
variables that serve as surrogates for the extent of divergence of opinion.
It is strongest for the firms with short operating histories, with low sales,
low capitalization, underwritten by low prestige underwriters, avoided by
institutional investors, very volatile at the start of trading, and very
underpriced at the time of issuance. Divergence of opinion theory predicts
all of these effects, while no other theory does so.
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Endnotes
In this model, the potential (but not the actual) investor's estimates of
the rates of return are presumed to be unbiased estimates of the returns
actually to be earned. This is to say that if every investor's estimate of all
returns are averaged, and the experiment is repeated many times, the
average will approach the correct value. This is probably the most
favorable assumption that could be made for the efficient market
hypothesis. Notice, it is being presumed that errors are being made, but
that for every positive error there is a equally common negative error.
1

Since this is not a paper about the underpricing of IPO’s, Rock's theory
will not be discussed in detail. However, for those curious it also involves
a winner’s curse effect in which the less informed investor’s get relatively
less of the more oversubscribed IPO’s. To keep them willing to purchase
IPO’s the investment banks must underprice, on average, IPO’s. Notice
that a winner’s curse is involved in both the subject of this paper, and in
Rock’s theory, providing one reason why the initial underpricing and the
long run underperformance should be correlated.
2

For all firms sales would not be a good surrogate for risk. However,
sales are a good surrogate for risk in initial public offerings because firms
with expected sales as small as $500,000 would normally attract too little
trading to support a public market. Thus, the only firms with recent sales
this small that are taken public are those in a start up stage that are
expected to eventually have much greater sales. It is notoriously hard to
forecast the future sales, profits, dividends, and stock prices for such
start-ups.
3

